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Japan as a Major Territorial Contender：
Further Towards U.S.─Japan Military ‘Alliance Restraint’
Yakov Zinberg＊
This brief review article pays tribute to Japan’s multiple containment as a result of her 
being a major territorial contender.1 Japan is literally encircled by territorial disputes with 
major East Asian powers as territorial claimants, People Republic of China（PRC）， Tai-
wan, two Koreas and the Russian Federation（RF）， which, to a large extent, view each 
other as a major security threat. Given the fact that formation of East Asian regional col-
lective security system is hardly feasible in the visible future, while the U.S. military pres-
ence in the region remains primarily dependent upon continuation of the security treaty 
between Japan and the United States, it is only natural to relate Japan’s territorial dis-
putes to the issue of the U.S. military presence in East Asia at large. The author strives to 
identify Japan’s territorial disputes, both current and potential, and briefly sketch a con-
nection between Japan’s multiple territorial disputes and the US military presence in East 
Asia, concentrating in particular upon the Russo─Japanese territorial dispute.
The presentation singles out the “Northern Territories”dispute, involving Russia and 
Japan, as a major case study, considering substantial US involvement in its evolution 
throughout the Cold War period. However, the Russo─Japanese territorial dispute is also 
viewed as no more than a representative case study, given the fact that all of Japan’s cur-
rent and potential disputes are rooted in both legal and political implications of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty（SFPT）， concluded in the wake of the World War II in 1951, and 
consequently share a number of fundamentally common features.
＊　Professor, Faculty of Asian Studies, Kokushikan University, Tokyo, Japan
1　The text is a modified version of a paper offered for presentation at the International 
Workshop “Seventy Years Since the End of the War in Asia” that was held in Munich, 
Germany, on 29─30 January, 2016. Only selected bibliographical references are provided. 
Photos attached were made by the author.  For detailed conference data see scanned copies 
appearing below.
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The article is largely based on two frequently misguided assumptions. First of all, I as-
sume that it is wrong to assess Japan as a balancing regional power： the currently pro-
gressing revision of Japan’s “peaceful”constitution, focussing on reinterpreting Article 9, 
coupled with Japan’s reluctance to come to terms with her wartime past only serve to re-
inforce hard─liners in the neighbouring countries. Secondly, which matters most, I assume 
that World War II has not ended in East Asia at large, to which Japan’s multiple territori-
al disputes clearly testify. While the 1951 San Francisco Treaty is widely viewed as hav-
ing formally put an end to the war, neither the Republic of Korea（RK）nor the PRC were 
invited to take part in it, while the Soviet Union left the conference and has remained out-
side of its legal sphere of influence. 
Nevertheless, the SFPT remains a major reference source concerning Japan’s territorial 
disputes with her neighbouring states. It is just as apparent that the US has played a deci-
sive role in both the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal and the 1951 SFPT proceedings, and 
may not be viewed as an outside observer in any of the regional territorial disputes. Be-
sides, as fairly noted by Professor Gi─Wook Shin of Stanford University, there is a growing 
concern regarding a legal status of the U.S. strategic bombings, including atomic bombings 
directed against Japan during the Pacific war. 2
While contesting a group of islands to the north of Japan’s northernmost island of Hok-
kaido which are administered by the RF as a part of the “Kurile Islands”chain, Japan is 
also demanding control over two rocky islets surrounded by 33 smaller rocks controlled 
by RK, known collectively as “Dokdo”in Korea and “Takeshima”in Japan. Besides, while 
administering as a part of Okinawa Prefecture a group of eight uninhibited islands and 
barren rocks located approximately 120 nm away from Taiwan, 200 nm east of China’s 
mainland and 200 nm away from Japan─controlled island of Okinawa, called “Senkaku”in 
Japan and “Tiao Yu Tai”in China, Japan is also engaged in denouncing as illegitimate the 
PRC’s and Taiwan’s claims for gaining sovereignty over that territory. 
Japan’s territorial disputes involve East Asia’s major nuclear powers, Russia and China, 
as direct adversaries. In addition, conflicting claims involving Japan assume global dimen-
sions when considered against the background of the United States’ indirect involvement 
in terms of the current security alliance between the US and Japan, which incidentally 
2　Shin, Gi─Wook. “Historical Disputes and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia：the US Role.” 
Pacific Affairs：Vol. 83, No. 4, December 2010.
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serves to complicate further the territorial dispute between Japan and RK, yet another 
major Asia─Pacific regional ally of the United States.
To be sure, the United States, like China, Taiwan, South Korea and Russia, has a mari-
time boundary with Japan in the Pacific Ocean in the “Northern Marianas”area, the Unit-
ed States Commonwealth Territory. Japan’s only peaceful border, delimitation with the 
Northern Marianas concerns frontier area between two archipelagoes, the “Northern Mar-
ianas”and Japan’s “Volcano Islands”（Kazan Retto）which are hundreds of miles apart.
An island state, Japan has only maritime boundaries, which enormously raises the over-
all significance of her boundary disputes. Firstly, the ongoing search for marine resources 
is widely considered to be a matter of strategic importance. Suffice it to recall that more 
than 20 per cent of our planet’s confirmed oil and natural gas deposits are located along 
continental shelves. More than 125 countries are currently actively engaged in both seek-
ing and managing such types of resources, typically making use of sophisticated high─tech 
installations. 
Moreover, Japan is located in the Asia─Pacific region which contains the largest island─
composed countries on Earth, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore and 
Malaysia. Located inside the world’s largest ocean area, the Asia─Pacific region states oc-
cupy about 19 percent of the planet’s land surface and control over 32 per cent of the 
world’s population. High expectations of the region’s becoming the center of world econo-
my and politics at large continue to attract attention.
Ever since the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea（UNCLOS）ad-
opted the Convention of the Law of the Sea in April 1982, within only 20 years that fol-
lowed more than 130 coastal and island states proceeded to control over 30 per cent of the 
world ocean surface, referring to the Convention─defined legal regime. Considering that le-
gal possession of islands, reefs, rocks and other similar features might lead to controlling 
larger maritime space, including seabed and ocean floor, it is no wonder that territorial 
disputes involving such features are among the most intense and threatening. In this re-
gard it is remarkable that while there are eight major island─centered disputes in the 
western Pacific area, including disputes over the Spratlies, the Pratas（Tungsha）Islands, 
the Pescadores Islands, the Paracel Islands and the Natuna（Bunguran）Islands, Japan is 
directly engaged in as many as three of them and indirectly engaged in the remaining five. 
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The indirect involvement applies, for example, to the issue of security of “sea lanes of 
communications”（SLOCs）in the South China Sea area through which Japanese oil tank-
ers routinely carry more than 70 per cent of Japan’s oil imports.
It is also worth mentioning two other relevant aspects of Japan’s maritime boundary 
disputes, one of which concerns a considerable number of disagreements about the delimi-
tation process per se. Thus, the PRC and Japan, apart from their outstanding historical 
and political debates, have different views on delimitation of continental shelf. Secondly, 
maritime boundary disputes are capable of affecting delimitation proceedings of adjacent 
states not necessarily involved in any of the disputes. For example, while examining Japan’s 
maritime disputes we find out as well that the very existence of a maritime boundary 
between Russia and South Korea depends in particular on sovereignty status of the 
“Takeshima/Dokdo”island group（frequently designated as Liancourt Rocks）disputed be-
tween Japan and South Korea. In fact, in the Asia─Pacific region Russia shares a mutually 
agreed maritime boundary only with North Korea, without according a full weight to the 
legal status of the “Takeshima/Dokdo”island group.
The Russo─Japanese territorial dispute over sovereignty of the islands of Kunashiri
（“Kunashir”in Russian）， Etorofu（Iturup）， Shikotan（Sikotan）and the Habomais（Habo-
mai or Ploskie）is deeply rooted in a legally acceptable definition of the “Kurile Islands”
term. Appearing in the wake of World War II and directly related to the evolving Cold 
War and consequent rivalry between two superpowers, the United States and the former 
Soviet Union, the “Kurile Islands dispute”， as it is commonly known, is composed of a mix-
ture of political and legal components. At the same time, the current dispute carries with 
it an inherited burden of intense territorial exchanges which have occurred between Rus-
sia and Japan starting from the second half of the 19th century. Having engaged in mutual 
militarized conflicts as often as four times, Japan and Russia rank tenth and fourth, respec-
tively, among ten leading sovereign states as regards involvement in territorial transfers 
from 1816 through 1980s.
In the wake of World War II, the ‘Kurile Islands’，including Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan 
and the Habomais, were seized by the Soviet Union. These islands were occupied by the 
Soviet Army soon after the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan on August 8, 1945. 
In 1947 the “Kurile Islands”were incorporated into the Southern Sakhalin Region of the 
Soviet Union’s Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic（RSFSR）and are currently 
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placed under administrative control of the Sakhalin Region of the Russian Federation, with 
a peace treaty between both countries remaining to be concluded.
Acting as a claimant requesting “return”of the disputed islands, Japan primarily refers 
to the SFPT, signed in 1951, as a legal basis of her demands. Officially replying in Novem-
ber 2006 to the National Diet deputy Suzuki Muneo’s query regarding in particular a sov-
ereignty status of the “Chishima（Kuril）Islands”， the government of Japan clearly stated 
that while there do exist territorial claims regarding sovereignty status applicable to the 
islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and Habomais, Japan does not consider either the 
Southern Sakhalin or the “Chishima（Kuril）Islands”to be her territory because in accor-
dance with the relevant SFPT provisions it had lost any rights in relation to the above 
mentioned territories. 
The Japanese government’s position reflects an overwhelming legal significance of the 
SFPT provisions pertaining to the status of the “Kuril Islands”as well as makes it clear 
that the disputed islands are viewed as not being a part of the “Kurile Islands”．It is there-
fore compelling to assess the legal value of the SFPT provisions as they relate to the 
scope and features of the “Kurile Islands”．
In that particular regard Article 2 Section（c）of the SFPT is being of an utmost impor-
tance, stipulating as it is that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Is-
lands.” Being the only relevant reference to the “Kurile Islands”in the text of the SFPT 
as a whole, it lacks clarity as regards the scope of the islands mentioned. Nor does it make 
clear whether or not the “Kurile Islands”had to be ceded necessarily in favor of the Sovi-
et Union. These two features in effect serve to cause substantial damage to Russia’s legal 
sovereignty claims related to the “Kuril Islands”．
Furthermore, while both the customary treaty law and Article 32 of the Vienna Conven-
tion indicate that in cases when language of a treaty is ambiguous or obscure it is permis-
sible to investigate preparatory work and circumstances pertinent to its conclusion, the 
Soviet Union’s eventual refusal to sign the treaty serves as a clear sign of a highly nega-
tive legal environment, which in effect has caused further damage to the validity of Russia’s 
territorial claims. Finally, with the SFPT Article 25 stipulating that “the treaty shall not 
confer any rights, titles or benefits on any state which is not an Allied power as herein de-
fined”，while the latter definition in particular assumes that “the state concerned has 
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signed and ratified the treaty”， Japan’s position gains considerable additional legal benefits.
In Russia, the currently disputed islands, along with their numerous adjacent and adjoin-
ing islets, are regarded as belonging to the “Kurile Islands“ chain which is in turn divided 
into the “Greater Kurile”chain, bordering the Kamchatka Peninsula in the north, and the 
“Lesser Kurile”chain, bordering Japan’s northernmost island of Hokkaido in the south. 
 
In Japan, designation of the disputed islands as not belonging to the “Kurile Islands”
chain dates back to early 1960’s, while until then it was common for the Japanese to re-
gard the whole range of islands stretching from Hokkaido to the Kamchatka Peninsula, in 
some instances excluding either Shikotan or the Habomais, or both, as the “Kurile（Chishi-
ma）Islands”．
Typically, in accordance with accepted practice, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
（MOFA）Public Information Bureau stipulated in a brochure issued in 1955 and entitled 
The Habomais islets observed from Cape Nosappu, Hokkaido
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The Northern Islands. Background of Territorial Problems in the Japanese─Soviet Negotia-
tions that the “Kuriles”were “a chain of thirty─odd small islands which hang out like a 
garland from Hokkaido, one of the four principal islands of Japan, to Kamchatka Peninsula 
of the U.S.S.R. over a distance of 750 miles（1,200 kilometers）．” A no less important pas-
sage of the brochure indicated as follows： “By virtue of the Treaty of Amity between Ja-
pan and Russia signed in 1855, the latter obtained the string of islands north of Uruppu. 
Twenty years later, however, Japan took possession of them in compensation for her aban-
donment of her title to Sakhalin”， concluding that “thus the Kuriles in their entirety be-
came Japanese territory.” However, the MOFA’s annual publication entitled “Japan’s 
Northern Territories”， issued in 1991, typically stated referring to “the important treaties 
concluded between the two countries in the past” that the “Northern Territories”， a term 
routinely applied in Japan to the disputed islands, were not included in the “Kurile 
Islands”renounced in accordance with the SFPT provisions. 
A major change was initiated in October 1961 by the then ruling Japan’s Liberal─Demo-
cratic Party（LDP）which in the statement entitled Government’s Position on the Northern 
Territories Issue announced that Shikotan and the Habomais had geographically and ad-
ministratively been a part of Hokkaido and hence were not included in the renounced 
“Kurile islands”chain, while Kunashiri and Etorofu did not belong to the latter island 
chain because according to bilateral agreements of 1855 and 1875 the term “Kurile Is-
lands”allegedly implied only the islands located to the north of and including Uruppu. 
In support of these arguments the LDP statement referred to a speech made by the 
U.S. Ambassador Plenipotentiary at the San Francisco Peace Conference, John F. Dulles, 
on September 5, 1951 in which Dulles had stated that the U.S. government viewed the 
“Habomais Islands”as not included in the “Kurile Islands”mentioned in Article 2（c）of 
the SFPT, abstaining, however, from mentioning the island of Shikotan in that context. 
Furthermore, in support of the claims applied to Kunashiri and Etorofu, the statement 
mentioned Aide─Memoire of the U.S. government as of 7 September, 1956, addressed to 
the government of Japan, which did specify that both islands “have always been part of 
Japan proper and should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty”but 
failed to identify them as being not a part of the “Kurile islands”chain. The Aide─Memoir 
did, however, refer to Shikotan as “a part of Hokkaido”． 
The LDP’s position had clearly reflected peculiarities of international environment, fea-
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turing growing tensions between the former Soviet Union and the U.S. as in reference in 
particular to January 1960 revision of the U.S.─Japan Security Treaty, which had been ini-
tially concluded simultaneously with the signing of the SFPT in 1951. On 27 January, 1960 
the Soviet government proceeded to issue a document widely known as “Gromyko Memo-
randum”which stipulated that “the Soviet Union cannot allow itself to contribute to an ex-
tension of the territory used by foreign armed forces by handing”the Habomais and Shi-
kotan to Japan, mentioned as an option in the Soviet─Japanese Joint Declaration signed in 
1956. This declaration in effect restored diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
At the same time, the “Gromyko Memorandum”positively promised to turn the Habomais 
and Shikotan over to Japan “on condition of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the 
territory of Japan and the conclusion of a peace treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Japan”．
Replying to this memorandum on the same day, the LDP government made it clear that 
it was “unable to recognize the Soviet position in attaching a new condition to the terms 
of the Joint Declaration concerning the territorial problem”， simultaneously proclaiming 
that it “shall continue to ask for the return of not only Habomais and Shikotan islands but 
other territories which inherently belong to Japan.”On 24 February, 1960 the Soviet Union 
proceeded to send yet another memorandum addressed to the Japanese government, de-
claring that Japan’s claims “for the recovery of other territories as well”could only be re-
garded as “an expression of dangerous revenge─seeking tendencies.”
It is crucial to admit that from a legal standpoint deliberations on the issue of the status 
of Etorofu and Kunashiri observed through the realm of inter─party rivalry between the 
LDP, Japan’s ruling party for most of the post─World War II period, and the former Japa-
nese Socialist Party（JSP）amply testify to the lack of consensus regarding definition per 
se of the renounced “Kurile Islands”stretch, which in effect serves to substantially weak-
en the claimant’s appeal. 3
Similarly, Japan’s other territorial disputes have developed as a result of a highly com-
3　See “Kurile Islands” entry authored and monitored by Yakov Zinberg in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law at http： //opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL; see also 
Zinberg, Yakov. “The Initial Response of the Japan Socialist Party（JSP）Towards the 
‘Northern Territories’ Issue：A Case Study How Far Do the ‘Kuril Islands’ Stretch?” at 
https： //kiss.kokushikan.ac.jp/pages/contents/0/data/1003531/0000/registFile/2186_ 
3709_009_02.pdf
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plex combination of the US heavy involvement and contradictory historical, political and 
legal factors, which makes up a fruitful milieu in terms of the evolving “pivot in Asia”US 
strategy. However, arguably Obama administration’s most prominent defense policy, the 
“pivot”， or rebalance, to the Asia─Pacific might as well bring about unpredictable negative 
results. Solidifying her control over the Senkaku islets by means of purchasing them in 
September 2012, Japan’s government had to face unexpected PRC’s response in May 2013 
when two prominent academics, in a scholarly editorial of the “People’s Daily”newspaper, 
proceeded to question legitimacy of Japan’s control of the entire Ryukyu islands chain, in-
cluding the island of Okinawa. Suffice it to recall that Okinawa makes up less than 1 per-
cent of Japan’s total land area but about 75 percent of the US military bases in Japan are 
stationed on the island. To be specific, about 50,000 US troops are stationed in Japan, with 
more than half residing on Okinawa, one of the largest concentrations of the US military 
anywhere. 
To a very large extent, Japan’s multiple territorial disputes add their share to regional 
tensions, serving in particular as a powerful instrument of coercive diplomacy and security 
threats. On Japan’s domestic policies level, returning to the issue of a rapidly evolving revi-
sion of Japan’s Constitution that imposes legal constraints in regard to Japan’s military ac-
tivities, we might expect a growing level of repression as a result of Japan’s heavy involve-
ment in multiple territorial conflicts. Thorin Wright fairly cautions, concluding as follows：
“Does territorial conflict affect domestic repression? The answer, in short, is yes, but I 
have shown that the way in which such conflicts affect repression is complicated by two 
sets of factors： regime type and the salience of conflict. I argue and find that when seek-
ing to revise territory abroad, states can take advantage of in─group/out─group dynamics 
domestically to increase repression”．4
It remains to observe how that applies to formation of the evolving new territorial issue 
engaging the US, China and Japan, a vicious circle brooding, with consequences remaining 
open to a multitude of threatening options.
In the latter regard, particularly in terms of a theoretical orientation, an innovative 
framework elaborated by Jeremy Pressman, the first ever attempt of assessing the 
4　Wright, Thorin M. “Territorial Revision and State Repression”．Journal of Peace 
Research. 2014. Vol. 51（3）．
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restraint in a context of existing explanations of alliances formation as well as the first 
ever attempt “to compare explanations for the success or failure of attempts at alliance 
restraint”is highly promising. 5 Alliance restraint has been analytically studied so far 
mainly by three authors, excluding Pressman, namely Paul Schroeder, Glenn Snyder and 
Patricia Weitsman, with none of them having treated this issue in sufficient depth in a 
comparative context. 6 Pressman, as John Ikenberry has fairly observed, underscores “the 
view that alliances are not just protection pacts but also a form of political architecture 
that creates ‘institutional pathways’for the management of wider geopolitical relation-
5　See Pressman, Jeremy. Warring Friends： Alliance Restraint in International Politics . 
Ithaca and London：Cornell University Press, 2008, p.6.
6　Ibid., pp. 7─8. Pressman singles out Schroeder, Paul W., “Alliances, 1815─1945：Weapons of 
Power and Tools of Management” in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, 
ed. Knorr, Klaus. Lawrence：University Press of Kansas, 1975, pp. 227─263；Snyder, Glenn, 
Alliance Politics ; Weitsman, Patricia A. Dangerous Alliances. Palo Alto, Calif.： Stanford 
University Press, 2004.
Okinawa landscape
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ships. In other words, alliances are as much about allies as they are about enemies.”7 At 
the same time, Pressman intends to raise the status of the ‘alliance restraint’issue to a 
level of the currently dominant balance─of ─power theory, stipulating in particular as 
follows：
“In terms of alliance formation, the contrast is between the dominant explanation, bal-
ance─of─threat theory, and the restraint explanation. The former suggests that states form 
alliances in response to threats from actors outside the alliance. It is embedded within a 
larger belief that states form alliances to seek military protection. In contrast, the restrain 
alternative argues that states form alliances to rein their soon─to─be partners. Rather than 
protection, the restraint explanation highlights the role of control. Restraint demonstrates 
that one ally may use the alliance to control the behavior of other allies”．8
Seeing his scholarly attempt rather as an “exploratory exercise”determining in which 
of the case studies offered “the restraint explanation is relevant”， Pressman, nonetheless, 
challenges the very gist of a currently dominant explanatory version, or, as James Goldgei-
er points out, “breaches an important and understudied topic.”9 As it applies to the issue 
of alliance formation, the most contested area of research, Pressman – while admitting 
that protection from threat is being widely accepted as the major motivation behind alli-
ances formation – emphasized that “restraint, a type of control, can also cause alliances to 
be formed.”10 Pressman mentions four main findings of his research efforts, including, first-
ly, the fact that “some states form alliances with the intent of restraining their new ally”; 
secondly, the fact that “the success or failure of alliance restraint attempts depends on the 
willingness of the most powerful ally to mobilize its power resources”; thirdly, identifying 
“several conditions that make power mobilization more or less likely in the case of alliance 
restraint：deception, leadership unity, national security priorities, and policy alternatives”; 
fourthly and finally, the fact that “alliance restraint is different from efforts to influence 
policies among non─allies, the ‘regular’influence attempts in international relations.”11
7　Ikenberry, John, G. “Warring Friends： Alliance Restraint in International Politics
（Review）”．Foreign Affairs. 87：6（Nov/Dec 2008）， pp. 157.
8　Pressman, p. 11.
9　 Ibid.; Goldgeier, James. “Warring Friends： Alliance Restraint in International Politics
（Review）”．Political Science Quarterly. 124：1（Spring 2009）， pp. 178─179.
10　Pressman, p. 9.
11　Ibid., pp. 15─17.
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Pressman’s monograph introduces six case studies, including alliance formation cases of 
United States─Taiwan（1954）and Britain─Japan（1902）， in all of which both the threats 
and the restraint explanations are presented as plausible options. While Pressman’s mono-
graph examines mechanisms of“intra─alliance power relationships, looking in particular at 
moments when states try to use alliance ties to restrain risky military actions by their 
partners”，12 I assume that a relevant deep─rooted and widely shared perception, stressing 
that East Asian regional stability might be secured by the U.S. military presence in Japan 
as a means of restraining the resurgence of Japan’s military power, could be fairly viewed 
as appropriate and standing in need of further elaboration. 13
12　Ikenberry, p. 157.
13　See Ellings, Richard J., Olsen, Edward A. “America’s Asian Agenda： A New Pacific 
Profile”．Foreign Policy, 89（Winter 1993）．（Accessed through Academic Search Premier on 
May 10, 2015）．
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